In February 2016, the Federal High Court made a seminal decision in Nigeria's telecommunications industry. It struck out a suit filed by E.M.T.S. Limited (popularly known as Etisalat) against MTN over the latter's acquisition of Visafone Communications Limited on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This comment argues that the decision of the court should not be construed as "a missed opportunity" to address the topical issue of anti-competitive conduct in the sector. Instead, it represents a progressive step towards recognising the significance of exploration and compliance with the internal statutory procedures before bringing anti-competitive claims in courts. This would not only enhance compliance with the law but also avail an opportunity for courts to intervene and determine anticompetitive conduct in the sector if the sector-specific regulator fails to do so.
Introduction
Early in 2016, the Federal High Court of Nigeria made a seminal decision in the Nigerian telecommunications sector. The court struck out a suit filed by E.M.T.S.
Limited (popularly known as Etisalat) against MTN over the latter's acquisition of Visafone Communications Limited on the grounds that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the case. 1 The decision could be criticised on the grounds that the court squandered a rare opportunity to address the growing concerns about possible monopoly in the industry.
2 While this comment is not averse to this concern, it argues that the court's decision should not be interpreted as "a missed opportunity" to address the topical issue of anti-competitive conduct in the sector.
Instead, it represents a progressive step towards recognising the significance of exploration and exhaustion of internal statutory procedures before bringing anticompetitive claims in courts. This would not only enhance compliance with the law but also avail an opportunity for courts to intervene and determine anti-competitive conduct in the sector if the sector-specific regulator fails to do so. Part one serves as a primer to the comment. Part two provides a summary of the facts of the case and the decision of the court. Part three hashes out the core legal issues and the rationale for the court's decision. It also analyses and justifies the decision of the court. Part four concludes the comment.
Summary of the Facts and the Decision of the Court

E.M.T.S. and MTN Communications Limited were duly licensed by the
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) to operate 2x5 MHz, 2x15 MHz and 2x10MHz spectrums in the 900 MHz, 1,800 MHz and 2,100MHz spectrum bands. 3 Visafone Communications Limited, the 2 nd Respondent, was also duly licensed by the NCC to operate 2x10 MHz in the 800MHz spectrum. MHz, 1800MHz and 2,100MHz spectrums, 5 Visafone Communications Limited provided the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) services in its 800MHz
spectrum. 6 As a resultof advancements in telecommunication technologies, the 800MHz spectrum owned by Visafone Communications Limited became an important spectrum that assisted telecommunication operators to provide 4G Long
Term Evaluation (LTE) services in a highly cost efficient manner. 7 Comparatively, unlike the 1800MHz and the 2,600 MHz, the 800MHz could cover additional "distances due to its longer wavelength, geographical and enhanced indoor/inbuilding coverage and significantly cheaper cost of deployment."
8
The NCC had never issued the 800MHz spectrum to service providers in the GSM segment of the market. It had only issued the spectrum to non-providers of GSM services. 9 Thus, the spectrum became a rare but essential facility for the providers of GSM services. The evolution of the essential facilities doctrine and its application to the deregulation of the natural gas industry 24(4) Tulsa L. Rev. 605, 617, asserting that "an essential facility, is at a minimum, a resource possessed by the defendant that is vital to the plaintiff's competitive viability." In contrast, it has been noted that "a facility is truly essential when public necessity justifies treating that facility as a public utility. The duty to share a facility should only arise when occasioned by the needs of the public. Consequently, the needs of the competitor, the preferences of the consumer, and the analysis of the market are all irrelevant in determining what facilities are so essential that they must be shared." See Seelen, C. To avoid foreclosure of the right of parties to seek relief in a regular court, the Act allows an aggrieved party to apply to a regular court 25 for a judicial review of the decision of the Commission. 26 However, the right of an aggrieved party to apply to a regular court for judicial review is not absolute. Indeed, the Act expressly provides that the party must first exhaust all the procedures and reliefs under the Act before making such application before a regular court. It is a trite law that where a statute or rules are put in place for compliance for institution of an action or suit or proceeding, the method or procedure prescribed by the statute or rules of the court must be followed by a claimant otherwise the action will be incompetent thereby robbing the court of jurisdiction.
33
Given the above precedential decisions, it is reasonable and inevitable to assert that since the E.M.T.S. never followed the procedures for review under section 87 of the Act, Buba J. was right in holding that the suit was incompetent.
Equally important, the incompetence of E.M.T.S.'s suit was compounded by lack of evidence before the court to show that E.M.T.S. had either instituted or had a pending review proceeding before the Nigerian Communications Commission. At the very least, this dictum shows that the court did not intend to foreclose the right of the applicant to seek relief under the Act. Instead, it simply applied the principle of primary jurisdiction which requires that "a matter shall be considered by a regulatory before the matter comes under judicial scrutiny." At a didactic pedestal, although the expertise of a sector regulator makes the sector regulatory model beneficial to an industry, a sector-specific regulator may be prone to industry capture. Put another way, the constant interface between the regulator and the regulated entities "could in theory raise the risk that a sector-specific agency would be captured by the regulated industry, leading the agency to act to favour the interests of the industry rather than the public interest."
The above disadvantage of the regulatory model notwithstanding, it could be argued that the court's emphasis on section 90 demonstrates an admission that the Commission is in a better position to regulate competition issues than the regular courts in Nigeria. From a broader analytical perspective, the rationale for the emphasis transcends the technical nature and the expertise required to regulate telecommunications markets. 59 It also endorses the fact that the Commission could regulate to attain a smorgasbord of economic and social goals. 60 These issues may have informed the requirement under the Act that an operator who seeks a remedy should first comply with the statutory procedures before applying to the court by means of judicial review.
Curiously, the Court of Appeal had once decided that the procedures under sections 86, 87, and 88 of the Act are not permissive but mandatory. 61 As a common law jurisdiction, the Nigerian legal system recognises the doctrine of judicial precedent. 62 Recently, the court re-echoed this fact when it opined that:
Now, Nigeria is a common law country and the foundation upon which the common law system is erected is the doctrine of judicial precedent. In common law, legal systems, a precedent or authority is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding on or persuasive for a court or other tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts.
The general principle in common law legal systems is that similar cases should be decided so as to give similar and predictable outcomes, and the principle of precedent is the mechanism by which that goal is attained. More so, the above procedural defect was compounded by the fact that there was nothing in the claim of the applicant that showed that it sought the injunctive orders as a result of a dispute between the applicant and the respondent. Instead, a conspectus of the claim clearly disclosed that the applicant sought the injunctive order to restrain a takeover that it assumed violated the provisions of the Nigerian What the court stressed in the decision is that the enforcement of rights should be done within the ambit of the law especially where the law has provided clear procedures for seeking reliefs.
Conclusion
Dialectically, this comment has demonstrated that legally and symbolically, the decision of the court presents an opportunity for telecommunication operators to 
